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DISCUSSION PAPER: 
The Transitioning of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes 
 
1  Background and Purpose 
At the beginning of the century, NIST began the task of providing cryptographic key 
management guidance. This included lessons learned over many years of dealing with 
key management issues, and attempts to encourage the definition and implementation of 
appropriate key management procedures, to use algorithms that adequately protect 
sensitive information, and to plan ahead for possible changes in the use of cryptography 
because of algorithm breaks or the availability of more powerful computing techniques. 
This guidance is provided in NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-57. 
Some of the guidance provided in SP 800-57 includes the definition of security strengths, 
the association of the approved algorithms with these security strengths, and a projection 
of the time frames during which the algorithms could be expected to provide adequate 
security. Note that the length of the cryptographic keys is often an integral part of these 
determinations.  
The security strength is measured in bits and is, basically, a measure of the difficulty of 
discovering the key. The understood security strength for each algorithm  is listed in SP 
800-57.  For example, RSA using a key length of 1024 bits (i.e., 1024-bit RSA) has a 
security strength of 80 bits, as does 2-key Triple DES, while 2048-bit RSA and 3-key 
Triple DES have a security strength of 112 bits. See Table 2 in Part 1 of SP 800-57 for 
further security strength information. 
The appropriate security strength to be used depends on the sensitivity of the data being 
protected, and needs to be determined by the owner of that data. For the Federal 
government, a minimum security strength of 80 bits is currently required. However, a 
minimum security strength of 112 bits is planned in 2011 as indicated in Table 4 of SP 
800-57, Part 1. We’ve learned that this is not so easily done. The reality is that we need to 
examine each class of algorithm and sometimes make some adjustments. 
One of the means for enforcing the algorithm and security strength requirements is 
NIST’s Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP), which is responsible for 
validations cryptographic modules for conformance to FIPS 140-2. To be validated, each 
module requires at least one cryptographic algorithm that has been approved for Federal 
government use. Approved security functions (i.e., approved cryptographic algorithms) 
are listed in Annex A of FIPS 140-2.  The CMVP is the vehicle used for testing 
conformance to FIPS 140-2 and the approved algorithm specifications. In some cases, an 
algorithm or protocol that has not been approved in a FIPS or NIST Recommendation is 
“allowed”; an algorithm is indicated as allowed by means of the FIPS 140-2 
Implementation Guidance document. The CMVP has defined two classes of modes for 
cryptographic modules: the FIPS mode and the non-FIPS modes for cryptographic 
module operation; in general, the FIPS mode uses only approved or allowed algorithms 
can. 
This paper is intended to bring some of the transition issues associated with the use of 
cryptography to the attention of the Federal government and the public, and to obtain 
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CryptoTransitions@nist.gov by August 3, 2009.  
The general approach for transitioning from one algorithm or key size to another is 
addressed in SP 800-57, Part 1. The remainder of this paper addresses transition issues 
from the point of view of the CMVP.  
2 Encryption 
Encryption is used to protect the confidentiality of sensitive information. Several 
algorithms are currently approved for the encryption of sensitive information by the 
Federal government: 
•  Triple DES is specified in SP 800-67, and has two key sizes, known as two-key 
Triple DES and three-key Triple DES. Two-key Triple DES has been assessed at 
a security strength of 80 bits
1, whereas three-key Triple DES is assessed at a 
security strength of 112 bits. 
•  SKIPJACK was approved in FIPS 185, and is assessed at a security strength of 80 
bits. 
•  AES is specified in FIPS 197. It has three approved key sizes: 128, 192 and 256 
bits. AES-128 is assessed at a security strength of 128 bits, AES 192 at a security 
strength of 192 bits, and AES-256 at a security strength of 256 bits. 
NIST is proposing the following transition schedule (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Encryption Transitions 
Encryption Algorithm  New Validations  Already Validated 
Implementations 
Two-key Triple DES  Through 2010  Disallow after 2010 
Three-key Triple DES  OK  OK 
SKIPJACK  Through 2010  Disallow after 2010 
AES-128 OK  OK 
AES-192 OK  OK 
AES-256 OK  OK 
 
As of December 31, 2010, Two-key Triple DES and SKIPJACK will no longer be 
approved for use by the Federal government to protect sensitive data (see SP 800-57, Part 
1). No new validations will be performed on these algorithms after that date, and CMVP 
certificates that were previously issued will be modified to remove these algorithms from 
the approved list for the FIPS mode. Note that if no other approved algorithms are 
                                                 
1 Note that the conditions for this assessment are provided in a footnote to Table 2 in SP 800-57, Part 1.  
  2included in a cryptographic module, the certificate for that module will no longer be 
valid. 
3 Digital  Signatures 
3.1 Transition  from  FIPS 186-2 to FIPS 186-3 
Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 186-3 specifies three algorithms for the 
generation and verification of digital signatures: DSA, ECDSA and RSA. FIPS 186-3 
also includes methods for generating key pairs and domain parameters, as required. FIPS 
186-3 incorporates the following changes: 
General: 
•  Specifies the use of all hash functions provided in FIPS 180-3, rather than 
just SHA-1, 
•  Provides requirements for obtaining assurances of domain parameter validity 
(DSA and ECDSA only), public key validity, and private key possession, 
•  References SP 800-57 for guidance on key management, including the key 
sizes and security strengths to be used, 
•  Provides guidance on domain parameter and key pair management, 
•  References SP 800-90 for random number generation, rather than including 
RNGs in the Standard, either explicitly or by reference to ANSI Standards, 
•  Provides more guidance on the use of RNGs to generate key pairs, 
•  Provides revised primality test guidance. 
DSA: 
•  Specifies larger key sizes, 
•  Replaces the domain parameter generation routine with new methods, 
•  Includes explicit methods for the validation of domain parameters, 
RSA:  
•  Approves the use of both ANSI X9.31 and PKCS #1, and provides guidance 
for their use, 
•  Provides multiple explicit methods for the generation of key pairs,  
•  Limits the key sizes and provides criteria for the generation of key pairs to be 
used for Federal government use. 
ECDSA:  
•  Although the Recommended Elliptic Curves continue to be included in FIPS 
186-3 (as they were in FIPS 186-2), FIPS 186-3 allows the generation of 
alternative curves, using methods specified in ANS X9.62.  
Since FIPS 186-3 only recently became official, a period of time must be defined for 
transitioning between FIPS 186-2 and 186-3. Some of the new tests required for testing 
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made available as soon as possible.  
Implementations designed to conform to FIPS 186-3 may now be submitted and tested by 
the CMVP testing labs. However, those features for which tests have not been completed 
will be validated by vendor affirmation until the tests are available. 
New implementations designed to conform to FIPS 186-2 may be tested by the labs until 
December 31, 2010, after which only implementations claiming conformance to FIPS 
186-3 will be tested for validation. 
Certificates for implementations that were validated against FIPS 186-2 will continue to 
be valid, subject to the requirements for appropriate security strengths, as discussed in 
Section 3.2. For example, implementations that provide security strengths of 112 bits or 
more will continue to be valid and operable in the FIPS mode, but those that provide only 
80 bits of security will not
2. Note that the invalidation of certificates will affect all DSA 
(currently) validated implementations, and those implementations of RSA and ECDSA 
that only use SHA-1 for digital signature generation for non-repudiation purposes.  
In order to reach a larger audience, a Federal Register Notice will be published that 
requests comments about other issues that need to be considered during the transition 
from FIPS 186-2 to FIPS 186-3. Readers of this paper are encouraged to identify any 
issues that they foresee in order to prepare the Federal Register Notice with a realistic 
transition strategy. 
3.2  Security Strengths for Digital Signature Keys 
Digital signatures are used for several different purposes, such as:  
•  Data authentication (i.e., providing assurance about the authenticity of the signed 
data), 
•  Entity authentication (i.e., authenticating the identity of an entity (e.g., an entity 
that participates in a communication protocol), 
•  Determining that software or firmware has not been modified (see the integrity 
test on software and firmware in Section 4.6.1 in FIPS 140-2 ). 
When SP 800-57, Part 1 was written, the difference between these purposes was not fully 
addressed. While discussing the various uses of digital signatures in the government’s 
identity cards and the timeframes in which currently existing implementations could be 
updated to be compliant with the NIST-recommended security strengths, and in the 
design and validation of FIPS 140-2-compliant modules, the different uses of digital 
signatures was recognized. The guidance provided in SP 800-57, Part 1 needs to be 
revised to recognize these differences. 
NIST is proposing the following for the CMVP to address the aforementioned nuances 
for using digital signatures (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Digital Signatures Transitions 
                                                 
2  An exception is noted below in Table 2. 
  4Purpose  Digital Signature 
Process  New Validations*  Already Validated 
Implementations* 
Signature 
generation 
≥ 80 bits OK through 2010 
≥ 112 bits OK after 2010 
< 112 bits disallowed after 
2010 
≥ 112 bits OK  Data 
Authentication 
Signature 
verification  ≥ 80 bits is OK 
Validated implementations 
continue to be OK 
Entity 
Authentication  
Both signature 
generation and 
verification 
≥ 80 bits OK through 2013 
≥ 112 bits OK after 2013 
< 112 bits disallowed after 
2013 
≥ 112 bits OK 
Signature 
generation 
≥ 80 bits through 2010 
≥ 112 bits after 2010 
Software and 
firmware 
integrity 
test  Signature 
verification  ≥ 80 bits is OK 
Validated implementations 
continue to be OK 
 
*  Given in bits of security (i.e., security strength) 
 
Digital signatures that are intended to provide data authentication:  
•  Signature generation: New implementations must generate digital signatures with 
a security strength that is equal to or greater than 80 bits through December 31, 
2010; thereafter, the digital signatures must be generated with a security strength 
that is equal to or greater than 112 bits. Beginning in 2011, the generation of 
digital signatures with less than 112 bit of security strength will no longer be 
considered valid for the FIPS mode on a FIPS 140-2 validation certificate.  
•  Signature verification: New implementations may verify a signature that provides 
a security strength that is equal to or greater than 80 bits. Already validated 
implementations may continue to verify signatures at security strengths that are 
equal to or greater than 80 bits in the FIPS mode for the foreseeable future. 
Digital signatures that are intended to provide only entity authentication: Until December 
31, 2013, the minimum security strength required is 80 bits for the generation or 
verification of digital signatures for entity authentication. Beginning in 2014, only those 
digital signatures that provide at least 112 bits of security can be used in the FIPS mode. 
Note that signature verification for entity authentication is performed immediately after 
signature generation; therefore. there is no requirement to retain a signature for later 
verification. 
Digital signatures that are intended to determine the integrity of software and firmware: 
•  Signature generation: New implementations must generate digital signatures with 
a security strength that is equal to or greater than 80 bits through December 31, 
2010; thereafter, the digital signatures must be generated with a security strength 
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generate digital signatures with a security strength of 80 bits may continue to be 
used in the FIPS mode for the foreseeable future. 
•  Signature verification: New implementations that verify digital signatures may 
verify a signature that provides a security strength that is equal to or greater than 
80 bits. Already validated implementations that verify digital signatures with a 
security strength of 80 bits or more may continue to be used in the FIPS mode for 
the foreseeable future.  
4  Random Number Generation 
Random numbers are used for various purposes, such as the generation of keys, nonces 
and challenges. Several random number generators (RNGs) have been approved for use 
by the Federal government. Until relatively recently, FIPS 186-2 was used as an approval 
vehicle for three of these RNGs: a generator based on the use of the SHA-1 hash 
algorithm, a generator based on a symmetric block cipher algorithm
3, and a generator that 
was specified in a standard developed by the American National Standards (ANS) 
Institute (i.e., in ANS X9.31, and previously in ANS X9.17). In 2007, a new set of RNGs 
were approved in SP 800-90 that provide higher levels of security than the older RNGs. 
NIST proposes the following transition schedule (see Table 3). 
Table 3: Random Number Generation Transitions 
Description New  Validations  Already Validated 
Implementations 
SP 800-90 (HASH, HMAC, 
CTR, DUAL_EC)  OK OK 
SHA-1 (FIPS 186-2)*  OK through 2010  Disallow after 2015 
Sym. Alg.  (FIPS 186-2)*  OK through 2010  Disallow after 2015 
X9.31 = X9.17*  OK through 2010  Disallow after 2015 
*  Design or guidance does not support 112-bit security strength 
 
Modules that implement the RNGs specified in SP 800-90 can be validated and used for 
the foreseeable future in the FIPS mode. 
Modules that implement the three older RNGs will only continue to be validated until 
December 31, 2010. Modules that are validated as conforming to these RNGs can be used 
in the FIPS mode until December 31, 2015.  
5  Key Agreement Using Diffie-Hellman and MQV 
Key agreement techniques are used to establish keys between two entities that intend to 
communicate (e.g., the keys may be used later for encryption or message authentication, 
or for the generation of additional keys). Two families of key agreement schemes have 
been approved in SP 800-56A: Diffie-Hellman (DH) and MQV. Each has been defined 
                                                 
3 DES was specified as the symmetric algorithm for the RNG in FIPS 186-2. Since DES has been 
withdrawn, two and three-key Triple DES and AES can be used in place of DES as the core engine of the 
RNG  (see http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/rng/931rngext.pdf). 
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Key agreement includes at least two steps: the use of an appropriate DH or MQV 
“primitive” to generate a shared secret, and the use of a key derivation function (KDF) to 
generate one or more keys from the shared secret. SP 800-56A contains approved DH 
and MQV primitives, and approved KDFs. 
Many commonly-used protocols that perform key agreement use DH or MQV. Until 
recently, no validation testing was performed on implementations of these protocols in 
cryptographic modules. Validation testing is now available for implementations that 
claim conformance to SP 800-56A (i.e., conformance to one of the DH or MQV 
primitives used to generate a shared secret and a KDF specified in SP 800-56A). Other 
protocols that implement DH and MQV are allowed, but are not tested.  In the future, 
NIST will require that the labs test implementations of the DH or MQV primitives during 
algorithm validation testing. However, the KDFs that do not comply with the KDFs in SP 
800-56A will not be tested. 
Protocols are used for a very long time. When new versions of a protocol are designed 
and implemented, a vendor may need to include a capability to interoperate with the older 
protocols. Because of this, the older protocols (and the KDFs in particular) will continue 
to be allowed. However, any new versions of these protocols using DH and MQV key 
agreement must be designed to conform to SP 800-56A.  
NIST is proposing the following set of transition rules (see Table 4). 
Table 4: Key Agreement (DH and MQV) Transitions 
Scheme New  Validations  Already Validated 
Implementations 
SP 800-56A primitives  OK
1  OK 
Non-tested DH and MQV 
primitives  OK through 2010  Test by 2014 
KDFs:    
SP 800-56A  OK
2  OK 
IKEv2 OK  OK 
X9.42
  OK
  OK 
X9.63
  OK
  OK 
IKEv1
  OK
  OK 
SSH
  OK
  OK 
TLS (1.0, 1.1, 1.2)
  OK
  OK 
1  Currently, a primitive is tested only when the KDF complies with SP 800-
56A. Plan to test all DH and MQV implementations of the primitives in the 
future. 
2 Now  tested. 
Implementations that comply fully with SP 800-56A (i.e., both the DH or MQV primitive 
and the KDF) will be tested and approved for use in the FIPS mode for the foreseeable 
future. 
Other implementations of the DH and MQV primitives (i.e., non-SP 800-56A 
implementations) that have already been validated must have the primitive(s) tested by 
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2013. 
Implementations of IKEv2 and IKEv1, and the current versions of X9.42, X9.63, SSH,  
and TLS are allowed in the FIPS mode for the foreseeable future. Their DH and MQV 
primitives will be tested for conformance to the primitives in SP 800-56A. 
6  Key Agreement and Key Transport Using RSA 
SP 800-56B specifies the use of RSA for both key agreement and key transport. Like key 
agreement, key transport is a form of key establishment; however, the method for 
establishing keys is somewhat different. Refer to SP 800-57, Part 1 and SP 800-56B for 
definitions. SP 800-56B is currently in draft form, but is expected to be published as 
complete in the near future. The transition issues associated with the validation of SP 
800-56B implementations have not yet been addressed.  
Currently, the validation of protocols containing key transport schemes is addressed in 
the FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance, which states that the key transport schemes in 
SSL v3.1, TLS, PEAP, EAP-FAST and EAP-TLS may be used in the FIPS mode. Note 
that these schemes are not actually tested during module validation. These key transport 
schemes use the RSA algorithm. The continued acceptability of the key transport 
schemes in these protocols will be reassessed when SP 800-56B is completed. 
7 Deriving  Additional  Keys from a Single Key 
SP 800-108 specifies key derivation functions that use a key (i.e., a key derivation key) to 
generate additional keys. The key derivation key could be generated using an approved 
RNG, obtained using a key agreement or key transport scheme (see Sections 5 and 6) or 
could be a key that was manually distributed (e.g., by a courier). 
 
This specification allows a large variety of KDFs. At the present time, tests have not been 
developed to test against this specification. In addition, FIPS 140-2 Implementation 
Guidance does not include a provision to allow key derivation using the SP 800-108 
KDFs. Therefore, a new section of the FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance will be 
developed to allow key derivation using the KDFs specified in SP 800-108.  
8 Key  Wrapping 
Key wrapping is the encryption of a symmetric key by another symmetric key (called a 
key wrapping key) with integrity protection. Symmetric keys are used with algorithms 
such as Triple-DES and AES. See SP 800-57 for further information. At the present time, 
neither a FIPS nor a NIST Recommendation have been developed for key wrapping, 
although a specification for key wrapping using AES is available at 
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/kms/AES_key_wrap.pdf.  
The FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance (IG) addresses key wrapping as defined 
above. The IG states that AES or Triple DES may be used to wrap keys using the above 
referenced specification. If Triple DES is used, then it shall be used in exactly the same 
way that is defined for AES, and both Two-key and the Three-key Triple DES can be 
used for key wrapping. Note that since Two-key Triple DES will be disallowed after 
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after that date. 
9 Hash  Functions 
Five approved hash functions are specified in FIPS 180-3. The security strength for a 
hash function is dependent on its design and use, and is provided in SP 800-57, Part 1. 
Discussions about these different uses are provided in SP 800-107.  
NIST is proposing the following transition rules for hash functions (see Table 4). 
Table 4: Hash Function Transitions 
Hash 
Function  New Validations  Already Validated 
Implementations 
SHA-1  OK for all hash function applications 
through December 31, 2010 
Digital signatures: see Table 2 
Hash-only: Disallow after 2010 
OK for all other applications  
SHA-224 
SHA-256 
SHA-384 
SHA-512 
OK for all hash function applications  OK for all hash function applications 
 
The five hash functions can be validated and used for all applications through December 
31, 2010. In the case of implementations that have already been validated: 
•  When SHA-1 is used in the generation of digital signatures, see Table 2 for the 
continued use of the implementation. 
•  When SHA-1 is used for hash-only applications, the use of already-validated 
implementations is disallowed after 2010 in the FIPS mode. 
•  For all other SHA-1 applications and for all applications using the other hash 
functions, the implementations that have previously been validated may continue 
to be used in the FIPS mode. 
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